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September 2, 2003 
This Strategic Insight explores the impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) on the roles played 
by Congress and the President when it comes to decisions for war and peace, and the way the RMA is 
changing the distribution of war-making powers between the two branches of government. While the 
information-driven RMA is changing the character of wars fought by the United States, it also seems to be 
shifting the war powers "balance" in favor of the executive branch. The RMA appears to be strengthening 
virtual Presidential war powers, while weakening the position of Congress.  
War Powers in Theory and Practice 
According to the war clause of the Constitution, "The Congress shall have power … to declare war 
(…)."[1] There can be no doubt that the intention of the Founding Fathers was to give the legislature an 
authority to initiate war. Constitutionally, any use of armed forces abroad requires an explicit 
Congressional authorization. This, however, is not necessary in case of an attack on the United States, 
because such an act of aggression would mean that war had already been initiated.[2] The President not 
only has the power but the duty to repel any sudden attack despite a lack of Congressional authorization. 
The executive branch was given narrow war powers. They are limited to the Constitution's commander in 
chief clause, which says, "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the 
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United 
States."[3] Alexander Hamilton explained the essence of this clause in the following way: "when war is 
'authorized or begun' the president is to command the military operations of American forces."[4] The 
legal powers of war and peace also were included in the checks and balance system that is reflected in 
the organizing principle of the separation of powers. Richard Neustadt characterized this model as 
"separated institutions sharing powers."[5] Nevertheless, as historical practice shows, this model 
represents only the Weberian ideal type. Unilateral presidential actions in foreign affairs resulted in a 
"revision" of these constitutional principles.  
The shift in war-making authority from the legislative to the executive occurred over time. The turning 
point in this process was the Korean War and President Truman's unilateral decision of June 1950 to 
engage the U.S. armed forces in hostilities on the peninsula. This war, which was described by the 
administration as a "police operation" rather than a war, set a precedent as a "presidential war" waged 
without any authorization from Congress.[6] Truman's successors followed suit. The rise of the executive 
at the expense of Congressional prerogatives led Arthur M. Schlessinger, Jr. to talk about the "imperial 
presidency." Such a "shift in the constitutional balance," wrote Schlessinger, "received its decisive 
impetus … from foreign policy; above all, from the capture by the President of the most vital of national 
decisions, the decision to go to war."[7] Thus, the constitutional presidency was transformed into the so-
called "imperial presidency." 
In the face of a serious weakening of the presidency that was a result of the Vietnam War and the 
Watergate affair, Congress attempted to recover its constitutional war powers by passing The War 
Powers Resolution (WPR) of 1973.[8] Its aim was to retrieve and formalize Congressional control over 
Presidential military actions. The WPR can be summed up in four clauses: 
1. A consultation requirement stipulates "The President in every possible instance shall consult with 
Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where 
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances…" (Section 3).  
2. A reporting requirement obliges the president to report to Congress when U.S. armed forces have 
been engaged in hostilities "in the absence of a declaration of war" (Section 4).  
3. A "sixty-day clock" gives the president two months for concluding a military action plus an extra 
30 days under a Congressional extension (Section 4[a][1]).  
4. Congress can direct the removal of U.S. forces by passing a concurrent resolution (Section 5[c]).  
Although the goal of the WPR was to stimulate a genuine dialogue between the legislative and the 
executive branches on issues of war and peace and to revive the constitutional war powers ascribed to 
Congress, it had the reverse effect.[9] The Resolution enhanced Presidential war powers. As a result, 
"The presidency is understood to be proactive in the exercise of the war power, while Congress, for the 
most part, is understood to be reactive." The contemporary American RMA has further strengthened this 
model.  
The RMA and the "Imperial Presidency" 
A President who launches a military operation without a congressional authorization will attempt to make 
the use of force short and decisive. It is desirable to terminate an engagement within the 60 to 90 day 
limit imposed by the War Powers Resolution. Since long and large-scale interventions may lead to a 
political conflict between the Presidency and Congress, this threat undoubtedly has an impact on 
Presidents' conduct of foreign affairs. Such political conflict might weaken and undermine a President's 
position as a Commander in Chief or as a leader of an international coalition. A short and decisive war, 
however, does not pose a threat of a constitutional conflict between the President and Congress. 
The RMA facilitates fighting these quick wars. It reflects "the Napoleonic concept of war" which is typical 
of the American war culture, namely "that only decisive results are worth having."[11] Information 
dominance and supremacy in high-tech conventional weapons are supposed to enable the United States 
to win wars quickly. Rapid and precise air strikes paralyze an opponent's military and civilian 
infrastructures. This, in turn, makes ensuing land operation faster, more predictable and less costly. 
The United States has conducted several "RMA wars": the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the Kosovo war in 
1999, and the war with Iraq in 2003. The RMA allows various administrations to conduct "Presidential 
wars" (with no Congressional authorization) within the time limit set by the War Powers Resolution. In 
October 2002, for example, Congress passed joint resolution 114 authorizing President George W. Bush 
to "use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order 
to (1) defend the national security interests of the United States against the continuing threat posed by 
Iraq and (2) to enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq."[12] 
Congress thus made irrelevant its prerogative to declare war. A Republican Representative, Ron Paul 
summed up the behavior of the legislature in the following words: "Congress would rather give up its most 
important authorized power to the President and the UN than risk losing an election if the war goes 
badly."[13]  
Avoiding Casualties  
If a U.S. administration suffers far greater casualties than expected in a given conflict, then it is likely that 
the Vietnam syndrome might reemerge in American politics. Congressional opposition to the conflict 
would grow. As a result, the President's position would be weakened and his options for action narrowed. 
This could be seriously damaging particularly given the congressional threat of demand for force 
withdrawal (Section 5[c] of the WPR). The RMA, however, helps to avert this scenario by minimizing 
casualties among combatant and noncombatants on both sides of the conflict. Thus, the socio-
psychological dimension of the RMA reflects Western trends toward the humanization of warfare. 
Precision munitions, long-range missiles and unmanned vehicles move soldiers away from the battlefield, 
while information superiority facilitates highly effective operations that minimizes losses on both sides and 
reduce the likelihood that attritional engagements will take place. Indeed, a paradox of this post-heroic 
warfare is that more casualties are caused by friendly fire and accidents on the side possessing 
information superiority than are caused by enemy action.  
The RMA helps Presidents keep public support for military actions while avoiding conflict with Congress, 
thereby strengthening the executive vs. the legislative branch of the U.S. government in terms of war 
powers. This situation has been sanctioned by the practice of several administrations and a passive 
Congress. The RMA is making longer wars that might trigger the War Powers Act less likely, establishing 
de facto authority for Presidents to make war.  
Asymmetric Warfare 
The RMA is that is a double-edged sword. According to James Adams, "The countries that have the most 
effective IW [Information Warfare] capabilities are also the most vulnerable to attack—uniquely in the 
history of the world, a single individual armed with just a computer and a modem can literally hold 
America to ransom."[14] The accidental power failure that affected up to 50 million Americans in August 
2003 should be a warning that reveals an Achilles heel of the information-based society. An asymmetric 
adversary does not have to target the military to paralyze a state's infrastructure. In fact, because the U.S. 
military dominates the high-tech conventional battlefield, a determined adversary will be drawn to launch 
asymmetric attacks against a relatively vulnerable American civil society to undermine the American effort 
to keep war short with few casualties.  
Asymmetric war thus posses a great challenge to the new Presidential-style of war that has emerged in 
the United States. If asymmetric conflict turns long and bloody, Congress might become more vigorous in 
asserting its constitutional prerogatives when it comes to issues of war and peace. Adversaries might try 
to use asymmetric attacks to engage the "sixty-day clock" of the War Powers Act by extending the conflict 
or avoiding decisive engagements, increasing the chances for a conflict between Congress and the 
President.  
 
Democratization vs. Centralization 
There is a paradox inherent to the relationship between the RMA and war powers. On the one hand, the 
RMA is a strong democratizing factor within military organizations. The need of "jointness" (inter-service 
cooperation replacing traditional service-oriented structures) and the ability to communicate around 
traditional hierarchies, will over time force militaries to adopt more horizontal, decentralized and flatter 
command structures. The RMA requires military organizations to adopt the net-like structures that already 
dominate the most effective corporations. The "real-time knowledge" and "situational awareness" make 
traditional decision-making processes and procedures archaic. Military operations can no longer be pre-
planned since the intelligence information is constantly changing. As a result, many decisions, which were 
previously taken on a higher and centralized level, have to be made ad hoc by lower unit-levels. In short, 
the RMA undermines traditional and hierarchic military organizations and favors decentralized and 
horizontal structures.  
On the other hand, the shift in war powers from the legislative to the executive and the establishment of 
the "presidential war powers" represent the opposite process. It is characterized by centralized, 
hierarchical and unilateral decision-making. "Imperial presidency" is the antithesis of the intent of the 
Framers, who, as James Wilson put it, did not want "one man to hurry us into war."[15] The original idea 
was that there should be a genuine debate in Congress (the democratic representation of the nation) 
before the United States became involved in a war. In fact, the shift of power from Congress to the 
President as far as decisions on war and peace are concerned reflect a drift toward less democratic 
procedures. This paradox is of a significant importance for the analysis of the contemporary American 
way of warfare and its transformation. The decision-making process of going to war has become more 
centralized and less democratic. At the same time decisions regarding the conduct of war are becoming 
less centralized and more democratic.  
Conclusion 
Will war powers within the U.S. government be a subject of increased academic interest and debate? The 
answer is yes. If the 21st century turns out to be another "American Century," then the information 
revolution and the RMA may facilitate the return of an "imperial presidency," and the traditional, 
Constitutional vision of war powers may become obsolete. 
 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Homeland Security and WMD Proliferation Resources. 
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